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1.  Introduction 
University of the Saarland, Germany 
At the beginning of natural-language semantics as a formal discipline, there was the 
insight that the notion of meaning and the notion of truth are narrowly related. If we 
know the meaning of a sentence, we know whether it is a truthful or false description 
of a given state of the world. Meaning information contained in a sentence can 
therefore be modelled in terms of truth conditions: functions from possible states of 
the world to the truth values T and F. The meaning of non-sentential expressions is 
indirectly, but unequivocally related to the sentence meaning by virtue of the 
principle of compositionality . The picture is  an idealization, of course : 
Compositionality is not an empirical fact, but a methodological assumption . Its 
appropriateness and limitations have been intensively disputed. Also, identification 
of meaning with truth conditions abstracts away from important facets of linguistic 
meaning. The anaphoric potential, as a special case of the context-changing force of 
natural-language expressions, is the best-investigated and most intensively discussed 
non-truth-conditional aspect of meaning. 
Another problem arises from the requirement that either truth or falseness 
must be assigned to all sentences with respect to every state of the world. Word 
meaning often is so imprecise or underspecified that there is no clear-cut boundary 
between true and false. The vagueness phenomenon is pervasive in natural 
languages:  Almost every natural-language concept has some margin of imprecision 
in at least some cases of application. Prototypical vague expressions - colour terms 
like red and blue,  scalar adjectives like tall and clever, spatial adverbs and 
prepositions - come with a substantial borderline-area of semantic indefiniteness in 
any natural context (although the size and location of these areas may vary ) .  The 
vagueness phenomenon has never gained greater interest in linguistics, however. It 
seems to be more of a philosophical matter: A very basic and important problem, 
which needs to be carefully thought about, but which does not interact a lot with the 
res t  of natural - language meaning structure. In fact, most of the research on 
vagueness has been done in the borderline area of linguistics and philosophy . 
During the last years, however, interest has been growing in matters which 
are narrowly re lated to the semantics of vague expressions. This interest arose 
neither in theoretical linguistics nor in philosophy of language, but in the application 
oriented field of computational semantics. I t  emerged from the problem of a proper 
treatment of ambiguous expressions. 
Natural language expressions tend to be multiply ambiguous. Sentences do 
not have truth conditions per se, but only under a certain reading .  In the fie ld of 
natural-language understanding, the task is to determine what a sentence does mean 
in a given context of utterance rather than just what i t  could mean in general .  
Among theoretical l ingu ists, a s imple process model of utterance understanding is 
popular: the l inguistic component generates the set of all possible readings, and then 
a non-l ingu istic resolution procedure fi l ters out all but the one reading intended by 
the speaker of the utterance. This model is  neither cognitively plausible nor 
computational ly feasible . There is a need for representation formal isms which 
allows to avoid the generate-and-test sol ution, i .e . ,  formal isms which represent the 
range of possible readings in a more compact way than by enumeration of 
alternative interpretations.  Several such formal isms for underspecified semantic 
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information ("under specification formalisms" , in short) have been proposed during 
the last years. They are similar in their basic approaches, describing the range of 
possible re;tdings in terms of a constraint set, and modelling the resolution process 
as a stepwise, monotonic extension of this constraint set, which corresponds to the 
subsequent reduction of the range of possible readings. Also, these approaches 
cover comparable ranges of phenomena: local cases of underspecification (arising, 
e .g . ,  from lexical ambiguities) as well as global , structural cases like scope 
underspecification. 
It is an interesting question what the underspecified representations really 
mean, beyond the fact that they stand for sets of possible readings. Can they be 
assigned denotations directly, and in which way are these related to the denotations 
of the members in the corresponding disambiguation set? The question is interesting 
in itself, for one would like to have a precise notion of what meaning representations 
mean. However, there is a more substantial motivation to provide underspecified 
representations with a direct semantics .  The final result of the utterance 
understanding process in a discourse is quite often not a fully disambiguated 
reading, and in many cases this is not perceived as a flaw, nor does it render the 
exploitation of the utterance information impossible. Full disambiguation may not 
even substantially improve the usefulness of the utterance information, in certain 
cases . 
( 1 )  Most researchers in the Saarbrucken computational linguistics group work 
on some underspecification problem 
If you are interested in underspecification, and are told sentence ( 1 ) , you may 
conclude that it is a good idea to contact the Saarbriicken group, i rrespective of 
whether it is the same or different problems the group members work on, and 
whether they do their work collectively or independently. Drawing this conclusion 
involves reasoning on the basis of underspecified meaning representations. Of 
course, one  could do  the reasoning on  underspeci fied representations in  terms of 
applying standard deduction techniques to each of the readings it covers ,  and 
compare the results .  However, to use underspecified representations in  the process 
of semantic analysis, and to generate all readings out of them afterwards in  order to 
apply standard deduction in  paral lel is unnatural and inefficient again .  There is  a 
need for deduction techniques that directly work on underspecified representations. 
Accordingly ,  there i s  a need for an entailment concept and a direct denotational 
semantics for underspecified representations, in order to guide the development of 
deduction techniques and to control their performance. 
The basic problem for underspecified ambiguous expressions is s imilar to 
the vagueness problem mentioned above : There are cases where it is impossible to 
definitely assign truth or falseness to a sentence , because of underspec ified meaning 
!nform�tion. Of course, the vague�ess of red has a di fferent status from,  say , the 
Indefimteness caused by the ambiguity of bank, or by the fai l ure of ass igning a 
pronoun � .  un
.
lque  re ference . However ,  vagueness  and ambigu i ty - re l ated 
underspeclflcatIOn share the above-mentioned bas ic property : the i mpossibi l ity of 
definite truth-value assignment . Since the treatment of vague expressions in a truth­
conditional framework has been thoroughly investigated through the last decades ,  i t  
may be worth having a look into the arguments and solutions proposed in that field. 
The author of this paper tried to provide a general account of all kinds of vagueness 
and ambigui ty phenomena, inc luding a formal i sm which a l lows to describe 
contextual refinement or "precisification" ,  in his former work on vagueness ( [Pinkal 
1 985]  and [Pinkal 1 995 ] ) 1 .  
I w i l l  g ive a short report of U .  Reyle 's  Underspeci fied Discourse 
Representation Theory (UDRT) in the next section, as a representative of the family 
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of currently available underspecification theories. In Section 3, the relevant features 
of a denotational interpretation for indefinite expressions are sketched, with semantic 
covariation as the crucial concept. In Section 4, I will try to point out the relation 
between the two approaches, outline an appropriate concept of partial interpretation 
for underspecified representations, and indicate a solution to the problem of 
structural covariation between underspecified representations. In the final section, I 
will  address the question how the difference between vagueness and ambiguity is 
related to the level-distinction between representational underspecification and 
denotational indefiniteness. 
2. Underspecification formalisms 
During
. 
th� last ye�s, several formalisms for the representation of underspecified 
semantIc mformatIOn have been proposed.2 These formalisms are rather similar in 
their descriptive force and in the kind of the formal devices they use. A common 
feature is the use of meta-variables which range over expressions of the semantic 
representation language . A trivial example is given below, where (3) is an 
underspecified representation for the lexically ambiguous sentence (2), specifying 
the two specific readings in (4) . 
(2) Bill owns a pen 
(3) ( 3x(X(x) & own (b,x)) , X E { pen \ , pen2 } } 
(4) ( 3x(pen \ (x) & own (b,x)) , 3x(pen2(x) & own (b,x)) } 
The representation task is simple here, as it is in relational ambiguities ( l ike John 's 
b o o k )  or s i mple cases of refe rent ia l  amb igu i t ies , s ince the source of  
underspecification is a certain local position in the otherwise unambiguously given 
semantic structure. The position is  marked by a meta-variable, and the spec i fic 
readings are obtained by subst i tut ing the meta-variable with i ts  poss ib le  
instantiations. This technique is a l l  but  new, of course : e .g . ,  unbound variables have 
always taken to be a natural device to represent referential underspec i fication. 
Structural underspecification, as it is induced by scope ambiguities, is more difficult 
to handle because it concerns global di fferences in semantic structures .  Therefore 
underspecification cannot be restricted to some local part of the representation . 
All of the currently avai lable underspecification formalisms offer a treatment 
of this problem. The solutions look different, but are essentially s imilar . As an 
i l lustrating example , I give an analysis of a scope-underspecification example in the 
style of Reyle's UDRT. I use standard predicate- logic rather than DRT for the 
representation of object-level semantic information, for the sake of readabil i ty. The 
design of the description language formal ism and the choice of an object-level 
semantics are basically independent of each other. 
(5 )  Every student didn 't pay attention 
(6) { 'ix( student(x) --t ..., pay_attention(x)) ,  
...,'ix(student(x) --t pay _attention(x))  } 
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(7) { I I : 'Vx(student(x) -+ 12), 13: ., 4, 10: pay_attention(x), 
11 � IT, 13 � IT, 10 � h, 10 � 4 } 
Sentence (5) is ambiguous between the readings in (6), (7) is the corresponding 
underspecified representation. The representation uses "labels" Ii as meta-variables. 
They go into partially specified semantic structures like 'v'x(student(x) � 12, as in 
the simple case (3). But they are also used to name complex structures and express 
relational constraints between different sub-structures. "�" is a partial ordering 
relation standing for "subordination" ;  Ii :5 lj says that the structure labelled with Ii is 
subordinate or simply a (proper or improper) part of the structure labelled with lj . 
The labelling operator " : " can be read as equation between a label and a partial or 
full structural description. The designated label IT stands for the representation of 
the whole structure. The readings described by a constraint set are its minimal 
solutions, i .e. ,  the smallest object-language representations which simultaneously 
satisfy all of the constraints . In the case of (7), the solutions correspond to the 
possible linear orderings of scope-bearing expressions. There are two of them, each 
of which corresponds to one of the formulae in (6) . 
Constraint systems l ike UDRT allow to model the process of 
disambiguation by monotonic extension of the description. E.g . ,  disambiguation of 
(5)  to one of the readings in (6) is expressed by alternatively adding 13 � 12 or I I  � 
14 to the constraint set. Thus there is no need to generate completely specified 
readings as input to the resolution process. In our specific example, there is just one 
step of disambiguation possible. However, it is not in general required that 
disambiguation is done at once and completely. Stepwise addition of constraints 
may lead to a sequence of representations which express subsequent stages of 
partial disambiguation. Moreover, because of the declarativity of the formalism, there 
is no need for a strict sequential ordering between linguistic analysis and resolution. 
The formalism is basically compatible with interleaved or incremental architectures. 
As mentioned in Section 1 ,  underspecification formalisms are not only 
supposed to act as notational devices for a natural and efficient process model of 
semantic analysis, but they should also support direct reasoning with underspecified 
information. This, in tum, makes a denotation-based entailment concept highly 
desirable. I will finish this section by giving a short account of some " simple" 
solutions for the interpretation of underspecified structures which are based on the 
treatment of meaning alternatives as disjunctions. 
If Sentence ( 3 )  is uttered in a context where both readings of pen are 
possible interpretation alternatives, the hearer will take the sentence to be true, if only 
one of the readings corresponds with the facts, which fits well to the interpretation 
of ambiguity as disjunction. 
(8) Some student takes every course in linguistics 
Similarly ,  if (8 )  is uttered in a situation where all students take some course, but not 
all take the same one, the hearer is l ikely to accept the sentence as true on the basis 
of its wide (narrow-scope existential) reading, and to insist in the fact that there is 
an alternative narrow reading which would render it true .  This also seems to 
support the disjunction interpretat ion, since the wide reading is equivalent to the 
disjunction of the alternatives. Consider, however, Sentences (9) and ( 1 0) .  
(9) John doesn 't own a pen. 
( 1 0) It is not the case that some student takes every course in linguistics 
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(9) becomes already false according to de Morgan's Law, if one of the readings does 
not apply, when analyzed as negation of the disjunction of its readings. ( 1 0) 
correspondingly turns out to be equivalent with the negation of its wide reading, i .e. , 
its narrower interpretation alternative, which is a definitely counterintuitive result. 
The disjunctive interpretation goes nicely hand in hand with the pragmatic principle 
of charity, in plain affirmative cases like (3) and (8): If the hearer has the choice 
between different options to interpret an utterance, he will make his decisions in a 
way that the utterance expresses a true proposition. In the scope of a negation, 
however, the disjunction analysis leads to results which are contrary to the hearer's 
behaviour. They always correspond to the maximally incooperative choice of a 
reading. 
There is an alternative way of a disjunction analysis, however. So far, I have 
assumed that the disjunction is locally introduced by the underspecified part of the 
meaning representation, and may be embedded in the scope of other operators. 
Alternatively, one can take the semantic value of an underspecified expression to be 
equivalent to the global disjunction of its readings. This solves the problem with (9) 
and ( 1 0): ..,A will be interpreted as ..,AI v ..,A2, which again nicely conforms to the 
cooperative hearer's behaviour. The wide-scope disjunction treatment is adopted by 
[Reyle 1 993] .  Reyle defines an entailment concept on this basis, and sets it to work 
in a deduction system for underspecified representations. But there are general 
adequacy problems also with the wide-scope disjunction analysis . First, look at 
cases of non-assertional utterances like ( 1 1 ). 
( 1 1 )  Does John own a pen ? 
In a situation where (3) is true under one, but not under the other disambiguation, 
the disjunction analysis predicts an affirmative answer to ( 1 1 ) , if the question 
operator takes scope over the disjunction. This is hardly adequate, given that the 
hearer does not know about the reading intended by the speaker. Concerning the 
wide-scope variant, it is completely unclear, however, how a disjunction between 
questions should be interpreted at all . Another problem is that the wide-scope 
disjunction treatment leads to a much too permissive notion of entai lment. A set of 
premisses entails a conclusion, if every possible reading of the the premisses entai ls 
at least one poss ible reading of the conclusion. Now, take A to be ambiguous 
between two mutually exclusive readings. as in the case of the homonymous 
predicate pen. As shown in ( 1 2) ,  i t  holds that A entails ..,A, because each reading of 
A excludes the other, which is doubtlessly not a desirable result . 
Whichever spec ial pol icy is taken, the interpretation of underspec ified expressions 
in terms of c lassical disjunction is unsatisfactory . In the area of vagueness research, 
this has been a common-place truth for a long time al ready. As Max Black points 
out in  his c lassical essay, "the finite area of the field of application of the word is a 
sign of its generality, while i ts vagueness is indicated by the fi ni te area and lack of 
speci fication of i ts boundary" ( [Black 1 937] :432) .  In order to model the " lack of 
specification " in  a denotational semantics, some extension of c lassical standard 
semantics is required. Various proposals for such an extension have been made in 
the field of vagueness research.  In the following section, I will inspect and comment 
the major alternatives. 
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3. The interpretation of vague expressions 
Vagueness, as well as ambiguity, has the effect that in certain cases none of the truth 
values "true" and "false" can be definitely assigned. There are two basic alternatives 
for modelling this property in a truth-conditional framework. The range of possible 
truth-values (e.g. ,  by I for "indefinite") can be extended, or truth functions denoted 
by natural-language sentences can be taken to be partial functions, only. The first 
strategy leads to many-valued logics (esp. three-valued ones), the second one gives 
rise to so-called super-valuation semantics. 
The basic task for three-valued logics is to extend the interpretation of logical 
operators to the third truth value in an appropriate way. There are quite a lot 
proposals for three-valued predicate logics around, but the interesting ones coincide 
in their interpretations of conjunction and disjunction.3 The strategy followed is to 
assign a conjunction (disjunction) one of the definite values "T" and "F",  if that 
truth-value is uniquely determined by the definite values of the conjuncts (disjuncts); 
otherwise, it receives the indefinite value "I" .  Accordingly, A & B is true if both of 
the conjuncts are true, false, if at least one of the conjuncts is false, and indefinite 
otherwise; the truth functions for conjunction, and the corresponding one for 
disjunction are shown in ( 1 3) . 
( 1 3) a\� 
T 
I 
F 
T 
T 
I 
F 
I 
I 
I 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
v a\� 
T 
I 
F 
T 
T 
T 
T 
I 
T 
I 
I 
F 
T 
I 
F 
For the partial denotation account. the basic question is how truth-value gaps can be 
appropriate ly treated .  A solution is offered by the so-called super-valuation 
technique. which has been first proposed in [van Fraassen 1 968] .  [Fine 1 975 ]  and 
[Kamp 1 975]  demonstrate its appl icabi l i ty to the interpretation of vague concepts. 
[p1.nkal I ?85]  extends the approach la. a framework for the description of a variety of mdefimteness phenomena and their mterplay with context. 
The basic idea of super-valuation is  the determination of the value of a 
complex expression with semantically undefined elements by semantic properties of 
the set of possible completions, i .e  . •  those classical . complete valuations which are 
compatible with the given partial one. A complex expression is true under a partial 
value-assignment V . if and only if  it is  true in all c lassical completions of V . It is  
false. i f  it is false under al l  c lassial completions. and it is undefined otherwise. Take 
as an example a disjunction of propositional constants, pvq, and a valuation function 
V that assigns T to p.  and is undefined for q.  V can be alternatively e xtended to V' 
with V' (q) = T. or to V"  with V " (q )  = F .  Now.  accord i n � to the c lassical 
interpretation for disjunction. it holds that [ [qvpllV' = [ [qvpllV = T; therefore we 
obtain [ [qvpllv=T by super-valuation . Under the same partial assignment V , q&p 
wil l  turn out to be undefined, since [ [q&p]]V' = T, but [ [q&p] lv " = F, If a partial 
valuation V i s  undefined for both p and q. there are four possible re levant 
completion alternatives (say. V I .  V2 ,  V3 .  V4) .  Since there is at least a completion 
making both p&q and pvq true (say, V I with V I (p) = V I (q) = T), and another 
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completion rendering both expressions false (say, V4 with V4(p) = V4(q) = F), both 
p&q and pvq will tum out to be undefined in V. 
Thus, the super-valuation account results precisely in the three-valued truth­
tables of ( 1 3) .  There is an important difference, however. It becomes apparent if we 
look at the computation of the value for A&B and A vB in general (Le . ,  in the case 
that A and B are not independent proposition variables, but arbitrary expressions) .  
Take for example the case where B = -.A, and [ [A]]V (and accordingly [ [B]]v) is  
undefined. Whenever a classical completion V' of V yields truth for A, B will be 
false, according to the classical semantics of negation, and vice versa. Consequently, 
A&B will be assigned the value F, and AvB will be assigned T by the super­
valuation, disregarding the fact that both sub-clauses are of indefinite truth value. 
The super-valuation account differs in its fundamental properties from the 
three-valued approach. It is not truth-functional : the value of an expression 
containing more than one indefinite sUb-expressions depends not only on the truth 
state of its immediate sub-expressions, but also on their form. The deeper reason for 
the lack of truth-functionality is its sensitive to semantic covariation between 
different underspecified expressions ( [Fine 1 975] uses the picture of "penumbral 
connections" here). Also, there is a difference with respect to the preservation of the 
classical concepts of validity and entailment: Three-valued approaches make the Law 
of Excluded Middle as well as the Law of Contradiction contingent formulae 
because they invariably assign I to conjunctions and disjunctions with indefinite 
sub-expressions. Since the super-valuation is computed from the values in the 
classical completion set, it is conservative: there is no chance for a classical tautology 
or contradiction to become ever false or true, respectively. 
It has been extensively discussed, which of the two incompatible approaches 
provides the more adequate theory of indefiniteness. The important question to be 
asked is whether the interrelated properties of sensitivity to non-local correlations 
and conservativity with respect to classical logic are really desirable.4 Adherents of 
many-valued approaches have argued that indefinite truth-value assignment to cases 
like ( 1 4 )  and ( 1 5 ) be intuitively preferable to the treatment of the sentences as 
contradiction or tautology , respectively . 
( 1 4)  John is  tall, and he isn 't tall 
( 1 5 ) John is tall, or he isn 't tall 
An utterance of ( 1 4) seems not to be plainly false, given the fact that the vagueness 
of the adjective tall does not determine a definite truth-value for the sub-clause John 
is tall, but rather express the information that John is a borderl ine case of the vague 
pred icate tall. ( 1 5 ) seems to be a reasonable way to express that vague expressions 
form an exception to the Law of Excluded M iddle .  Thus the value " i ndefinite" for 
( 1 4)  and ( 1 5 )  appears to be better jus t i fied than the values " fal se " and " true " ,  
respect ive ly .  ( 1 4 )  and ( 1 5 ) are problematic evidence for semantic j udgments , 
however. I f  the sentences are logical ly determined,  the ir  d i rect i nterpretat ion i s  
pragmat ical ly deviant, and it shou ld b e  expected that hearers re interpret them i n  
order t o  make sense out o f  them, viz .  in the sense o f  ( 1 6) and ( 1 7 ) ,  where in some 
respect and definitely are operators quantifying over contexts/c lassical completions 
of the basic partial interpretation. 
( 1 6) In some respect, John is tall, in some respect, he isn 't 
( 1 7 )  John i s  definitely tall, or  he  i s  definitely not tall 
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( 1 8) John is tall, aTut Bill isn't tall 
( 1 9) John is tall, or Bill isn't tall (,either) 
The semantically unmarked sentences ( 1 8) and ( 1 9) form a better test case. Take 
John and Bill to be of identical height (and take them also to be otherwise similar 
adult persons, to exclude secondary contextual distortions) .  Then ( 1 8) must be 
clearly judged as false: Irrespective of where the borderline for tallness is drawn, one 
of the two conjuncts becomes false. As far as I can see, linguistic evidence speaks 
definitely in favor of the super-valuation account: not because it preserves 
tautologies and contradictions of classical logic, in the first place, but because it 
allows to model covariation between indefinite parts of a meaning structure, which is 
apparently an essential aspect of natural -language meaning. 
Having decided on a super-valuation-based semantics for vague concepts, we 
can view the status of the formal system in two different ways. One option is to take 
the system of assignments, consisting of a partial interpretation and alternative 
completions just as a technical device for the proper interpretation of vague 
concepts. The other possibility is to take the super-valuation concept as the kernel of 
a realistic model for contextual meaning variation. This view has been taken in the 
"precisification semantics " of [Pinkal 1985] .  I will shortly sketch its basic 
ingredients ,  putting stress on its underlying intuitions and just indicating technical 
detail. 
The basic decision is to consider assignments realistic interpretation options, 
which are induced by contexts of utterance, rather than technical devices.Then, the 
standard super-valuation formalism is far too schematic, of course. On the one hand, 
there must be different partial interpretations corresponding to different kinds and 
degrees of available context information. On the other hand, classical completions 
are an ideal which is hardly reachable in natural contexts at all. Accordingly, 
precisification semantics assumes a set V of partial assignments , which form the 
"precisification space" of a language or language fragment. The relation "�" of 
"being more precise as " is defined as the subset relation between the members of V: 
V � V'  if  and only if Dom(V) � Dom(V') and Yea) = V'(a) for all aE Dom(V). In 
addition, precisification semantics employs "context spaces" ,  partially ordered sets 
C whose elements stand for a certain amount of contextual information, and whose 
ordering relation Sc expresses the ordering of contexts with respect to informativity. 
A "precisification structure " is defined as a pair <V, <C, �c» , consisting of a 
precisification space and a context set, with a homomorphism from V to <C, �c>, 
corresponding to the fact that precision of an interpretation increases with the 
growth of context information. 
In order to make precisification semantics an equivalent to the standard 
supe.r-.valu�tion account with respect to meaning composition , the concept of a preclslficatlOn space must be strengthened, however. In [Pinkal 1 985 ] ,  this is done 
by the so-cal �ed "Principle of Precisification" ,  which consists of two complementary 
parts .  The fust part says that whenever for some expression a there are two 
assignments V,  V'E V such that Yea) :t V'(a), then there i s  a V " E V such that 
V " �V ,V ' ,  which is undefined for a. Intuitively, this constraint corresponds to the 
statement that every case of contextual variation is a possible source for 
indefiniteness . This appears to be a plausible assumption, if we take the hearer's 
view, who may be faced with any kind of deficient context information. The second 
part of the Precisification Principle states that for every assignment VE V which is 
undefined for some expression a, there must be assignments V', V"E  V such that 
V�V',V" ,  which assign a different semantic values. In plain text, the second part of 
the principle states that every case of indefiniteness is a candidate for alternative 
contextual specification . This statement seems to be less uncontroversial in the light 
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of prototypical vague expressions like colour predicates. But note that it does not 
imply that there be completely defined assignments V, nor even that a concept 
occuring in an utterance must have a potential reading which is completely precise 
reading. 
Taken together, both assumptions make up the the Precisification Principle: 
An expression is of indefinite semantic value, if and only if there are more specific 
contexts which make it precise in different ways. Technically, the principle imposes 
a closure condition on the precisification space which renders the precisification 
approach equivalent to the standard super-valuation account. Intuitively, the principle 
states an intimate interconnection between context dependence and indefiniteness. 
They turn out t� be the very same phenomenon, looked at from two different points 
of VIew: Indefimteness is the potential for alternative precisification. 
4. Underspecification and partial interpretation 
The super-valuation framework appears to be a good candidate for a denotational 
interpretation of underspecified representations, especially in its precisification 
semantics variant .s  The parallels are obvious: Super-valuation employs partial 
assignments, and provides the possibility to fill in the gaps in alternative ways . 
Underspecification accounts start with partial specifications of semantic structure, 
and allow alternative specification in terms of extensions of the constraint set. In the 
underspecification framework, disambiguation can be done stepwise, by adding 
constraints one after the other. In precisification semantics, the precisification space 
may contain chains of partial interpretations ordered by the S; relation. 
For the simple cases of local underspecification (e.g. ,  lexical ambiguities) ,  
the connection between underspecified representation and partial interpretation is  
straightforward. Take sentence (2) with representation (3 ) ,  which are repeated here 
as (20) and (2 1 ) : 
(20) Bill owns a pen 
(2 1 )  { 3x(X(x) & own (b,x» , X E { pen l ,  pen2 } } 
With respect to denotational in terpretation, X can be treated as a predicate constant 
which denotes a part ial function.  The set of possible completions is  determined by 
the constraint  X E { pen I ,  pen2 } .  Given that pen I and pen2 have prec ise ,  c lassical  
denotations corresponding to the sets PEN I and PEN2, we obtain two complete value 
assignments V I  and V2 , ass igning the values PEN I and PEN2, respectively, to X ,  and 
an indefin ite interpretat ion VS; V I ,  V2,  which assigns X the partial function q> from 
indiv iduals  to truth values wi th q>(X)  = T for members of both PEN I and PEN2 
(which happens to be the  empty set ) .  q>(X )  = F for individuals in the  complement set 
of PEN I U PEN2 ,  and which i s  u ndefined otherwise .  Accord ing ly ,  sentence (2) i s  
false ,  i f B i l l  does not stand in t h e  ownership re lation to any member of  PEN  I u 
PEN2, it becomes tru e ,  i f  B i l l  owns both a member of PEN I and PEN2 ,  and i t i s  
undefined otherwise.  
The disjunction treatment of underspec i fied representations di scussed at the 
end of  Sect ion 2 ( in i ts wide-scope variant)  col lapses the truth states " true "  and 
" undefi ned"  to " true " ,  and thus provides  a more l i beral notion of  tru th .  As 
mentioned above.  th is  w ider notion of  truth catches an important point  abou t  
semantic interpretation in real communication si tuations, i . e . ,  t he  hearer's adherence 
to the principle of chari ty .  The problem i s  that th is  kind of  cooperat ive truth 
assessment is  in tu i t ively plausible only for certain types of assertional u tterances, 
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whereas in the generaJ case a more "objective" notion of truth is in order. The super­
valuation approach provides both notions: the concept of "definite truth" - truth in 
all completions!precisifications of a given partial information - and the more flexible 
notion of being "acceptable as true" (true in at least one completioniprecisification). 
(22) Bill owns a pen, and John owns a pen, too 
(23) { 3x(X(x) & own (b,x)) & 3x(X(x) & own (i ,x)) , X E { pen } , pen2 }  } 
The other problem for the disjunction analysis is that its notions of truth and 
entailment are far too permissive in general. The flexible truth assessment is 
independently done for every occurrence of an ambiguous expression, which 
regularly leads to the selection of mutually incompatible contexts/ disambiguations, 
as in (22)/(23). The super-valuation account allows to model covariation of parts of 
the underspecified semantic structure . If entailment is defined in the most 
straightforward way - n= A if A is true in all classical completions! precisifications 
which satisfy r - covariation holds also across the entailment relation, which among 
other things rules out the unwanted A I= .,A case (see ( 1 2) above). 
The super-valuation account works well in that it keeps the choice of 
disambiguations consistent. The problem is that in some cases it seems to do its job 
too well. Take, e .g . ,  an utterance of (24), where both readings of bank are already 
present in the context. 
(24) The bank is located close to the bank 
It seems not to be a reasonable requirement for sentence (24) that both occurrences 
of bank covary in their interpretation. Natural language semantics requires a more 
relaxed notion of covariation for cases like this.  Also, in the case of scope 
ambiguities it is not really clear at all what "different occurences" may be and how 
covariation should work in general . All in all ,  it seems that the treatment of vague 
concepts cannot be generally transferred to ambiguity cases. On the other hand, 
covariation between occurrences of ambiguous terms definitely occurs, in cases like 
(22), or yet more mandatory , in the ellipsis construction (25) .  
(25) Bill owns a pen. and so does John 
We can bring these observations together by assuming that ambiguous expressions 
are in  general represented by different meta-variables. Identical (or co-indexed) 
meta-variables are introduced only in the case that covariation is explicitly required 
by the special linguistic construction (e.g. ,  ellipsis, parallel construction, correction). 
Vague expressions, on the contrary, have a fixed and unambiguous representation 
with an underspecified denotational interpretation. According to this proposal , the 
interpretation strictly follows the super-valuation approach for both vagueness and 
ambiguity phenomena. It has, however, different effects for different kinds of 
indefiniteness :  Different occurrences of a vague expression are bound to covary, 
since they are represented by the same object-language constant ;  differences in  
valuation may occur in certain marked cases ,  but  are due to local context shifts.6 
Different occurrences of ambiguous expressions covary only in specially designated 
cases .  In  general they are i ndependently disambiguated because they have 
independent representations. The notion of entailment resulting for these cases i s  
more restricted than for the covariation cases: A entails B, if every disambiguation of 
A entails every disambiguation of B.7 
The picture of an interpreted underspecification formalism i s  incomplete, so 
far. Semantic covariation requirements may not only hold for lexical and referential 
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ambiguities, but also for portions of semantic structure which are underspecified 
with respect to scope. The classical problem is the parallelism constraint for ellipsis 
constructions . In (26), the antecedent clause is ambiguous between two scope 
readings , the reconstructed elliptic clause is, too, but the sentence as a whole has 
only two rather than four readings, due to the parallelism or structural covariation 
requirement. 
(26) John recommended every student a book, and Bill did, too 
In contrast to the local ambiguity cases, covariation of scoping cannot be represented 
by just  using identical or co-indexed meta-variables ,  since it involves 
correspondences of arbitrarily complex pieces of semantic structure . Reyle 
proposes an extension of his formalism by a mechanism for co-indexing structures 
( [Reyle 1995] ,  [Reyle 1 996]) .  Co-indexed structures are interpreted by kind of a 
super-valuation mechanism, where the alternative completions are provided by 
contexts, which among other things contain complete ordering information for 
scope-bearing elements. Reyle's proposal is the first one, to my knowledge, which 
tries to handle the structural covariation problem within an underspecification 
framework, and he also designs a deduction system, which is sensitive to covariation 
effects (and definitely an improvement of the one given in [Reyle 1 993]) .  Since he 
uses quite a bit of technical machinery which is tailored to his UDRT formalism, I 
am not completely certain about the expressive power and generality of his structural 
indexing technique. 
I would like to indicate a solution for structural covariation which came about 
as a side-effect of a larger project on semantic analysis of spoken utterances.s 
Spoken input is often incomplete or incoherent, and therefore a source of another 
and more radical kind of semantic underspecification . In the most extreme case, the 
recognized portions of spoken input are just single words. In order to describe the 
semantic information contributed by such disconnected elements , the standard 
underspecification framework is extended by second-order meta-variables ,  which 
range over semantic operations, rather than expressions of the object representation 
l anguage . If  X is a standard first-order meta-variable, a a piece of semantic structure, 
and C a second-order meta-variab le ,  the constraint  X= C(a) expresses the 
information that a contributes to the semantics of X in some yet unknown way ( i . e . ,  
that X is  obtained by applying a simple or complex semantic operation to  a) .  
Covariation in  el l ipsis ca<;es can be naturally expressed with function meta-variables, 
as shown in  (27)  for Sentence (26) .  XA and XE are meta-variables for the semantic 
representation of the antecedent and the consequent clause , respectively. 
(27)  ( XA =CUohn),  XE = C(bil l ) } 
(27 )  requ i res that the con trast ive e lements John and Bill i n  the construction 
contribute to the semantics of their respective c lauses in the same way .  All this is 
very rough and s impl ified , of course . Concern ing the representation language, e.g . ,  I 
have not mentioned that the instantiations of the second-order meta-variables must 
be l inear functions ( in order to exclude, e.g. , constant function which overwrite their 
arguments ) .  For an adequate treatment of e l l ipsis , it is necessary to replace the 
identity requirement for the semantic operations in (27)  by a weaker constraint  of 
correspondence, in order to cover the wel l-known problem cases of e l l ips i s  and 
binding interaction. I cannot g ive a more detailed presentation of the second-order 
underspecification framework in this place.9 
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5. Vagueness, ambiguity, and the status of representations 
As I have shown in the last section, vagueness and ambiguity can basically be treated 
alike, on the level of denotations. In order to account for their different behaviour 
with respect to covariation, I have proposed a solution, which makes essential 
reference to a level of representation: Vague expressions are represented by unique 
constants with partial denotations, ambiguous expressions by meta-variables ranging 
over different constants of the representation language. This assumption seems also 
to correspond well to some other differences between the phenomena: Ambiguous 
expressions have a finite, at least a discrete set of readings corresponding to possible 
instantiations of meta-variables with objects of the representation language, where 
vague expressions tend to allow a continuous range of precisifications. Ambiguous 
expressions always allow complete disambiguation, whereas it is a significant 
feature of vague expressions that they keep an irreduible margin of imprecision. 
Disambiguation of ambiguous expressions requires the choice among alternative 
readings , which mutually exclude each other. Precisification of vague expressions 
takes place by reduction of the borderline area of indefiniteness in more or less 
arbitrary ways. Thus, for two different precisifications V and V' of a vague predicate 
there is always a (less indefinite and) more general one, which includes the positive 
application domain of V and V' in its positive domain. This difference is the basis 
for the standard ambiguity tests (see, e .g . ,  [Lakoff 1 973]) ;  I will refer to the 
distinction somewhat sloppily as the "most-general-reading criterion" in the 
following. 
There is one more, intuitively prominent, difference between typical kinds of 
vagueness and ambiguity . It has been often observed and described with different 
metaphors, for example in the following two citations: 
"Vague terms are only dubiously applicable to marginal objects, but an 
ambiguous term such as "l ight" may be at once clearly true of various 
objects (such as dark feathers) and clearly false of them. " [Quine 1 960] : 1 28 
" Vague and ambiguous sentences are subject to s imilar truth-condi t ions; a 
vague sentence is true if true for all complete precisifications; an ambiguous 
sentence is true if true for all disambiguations . . .  However, how we grasp the 
prec i s i ficat ions and di sambiguat ions ,  respect ive ly ,  i s  very di fferen t .  
. . .  disambiguations are distinguished ; to  assert an  ambiguous sentence i s  to 
a�sert, severally, each of its disambiguations . . . . .  precisifications are extended 
from a common basis and according to common constraints ; to assert a 
vague sentence is to assert ,  general ly, each of its precisifications .  Ambiguity 
is l ike the super-imposition of several pictures, vagueness l ike an unfinished 
picture, with marginal notes for completion . "  [Fine 1 975 ] : 282f. 
In vague express ions ,  the underspec i fied basic interpretat ion is cogni t ive ly 
promlOenl , .1 0  ambiguous expressions i t  i s  the di sambiguat ions .  Accordingly ,  underspec lfled Interpretations of ambiguous sentences occur ,  but  they occur  a s  
interpretations i n  the hearer 's underspecified context on ly ,  and are of a rather 
instable and volati le character, as opposed to the stable and unmarked vagueness­
type indefiniteness . Again ,  this fi ts we ll  to the assumed different representational 
status of vagueness and ambiguity - given that the level of representation has an 
independent cognitive reality .  One might even conjecture that the classical distinction 
between vagueness and ambiguity based on the notion of the uni ty of a word (see, 
e.g. ,  [Lyons 1 977] ) coincides with the existence of a single representational unit , i . e . ,  
an object of the representation language. 
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The problem is that not all of the distinctions between vagueness and 
ambiguity coincide. Just for completeness, I mention that the two criteria for 
vagueness diverge : The continuity-discreteness distinction draws a narrower 
boundary than the most-general-reading criterion. It is the continuity cases of 
vagueness which are the really hard ones for a logic-based account of meaning, 
since continuity of the precisification space causes practical undelimitability and 
gives rise to the so-called heap paradox. IO 
More importantly, the two criteria which are the most relevant ones for the 
notion of ambiguity - (non-)availability of a most general reading and (non­
)availability of a stable underspecified basic reading - are not co-extensional. Take 
the adjective fast, which is an example for the systematic ambiguity between a stage 
level and an individual-level, dispositional reading. 
(28) The Porsche isfast. and the 2CV is, too 
(29) There are two fast cars in the street 
If you are in a situation where a Porsche is parked in a residential street , and a 2CV 
passes by with a speed of 50mph, it would be strange to utter (28) or (29). There is 
no common most general reading covering the stage and individual level uses of 
fast. Therefore, fast is clearly ambiguous rather than vague . However, in cases 
where the ambiguity is irrelevant for the truth assessment of the utterance, the 
underspecified use of the predicate fast is perfectly fine. Sentence (30),  when 
uttered with emphasis about a Porsche which rushes along the German Autobahn 
with 1 30 mph, assigns both readings of fast at the same time, and there is no need 
for disambiguation. 
(30) This is a fast car! 
Another interesting case where unmarked use of the underspecified semantics is 
possible are scope ambiguities. In fact ,  I gave an example already in ( I )  of Section 
1 .  Speakers often seem to use scope-ambiguous utterances without having a certain 
reading in mind. But quantifiers also pass the ambiguity test: It is a well -known fact 
that there is a covariation requirement for scope in el l ipsis constructions. Moreover. 
there i s  not even in princ iple a possibi l i ty to represent scope-underspec ified 
structures by a unique, only denotational ly indefinite object-language representation, 
because of the non-local character of scope ambiguities. 
Obviously ,  the ambiguity criteria of a widest reading and a stable basic 
reading do not coincide, and the di stinction cannot eas i ly  be re lated either to the 
denotational structure or to the representational status of ambiguous concepts . As 
always in cases where no straightforward semantic means are available to make a 
dist inct ion,  it is tempting to try a general pragmatic explanation . In fact ,  the 
examples considered suggest a pragmatic answer to the problem in terms of Gricean 
princ iples: " Strong " cases, which do not allow stable underspec ified representations, 
l ike pen , hank, and referential ambiguit ies ,  have disjoint extensions .  Therefore ,  
sentences get a chance to  become unequi vocally true only in the case that they are 
disambiguated . On the other hand, "weak" cases of ambigui ty l ike fast a n d  
quantifier constructions may wel l be true under both readings, and accordingly do 
not need immediate precisi fication . 
However, this cannot be the answer, either. As pointed out above, Sentence 
(20) can be defin i tely true , but this does not give i ts  basic underspeci fied 
interpretation the same status as ( I )  or (30). I wil l  not discuss the possibility to state 
a pragmatically relevant difference between the pen and the fast cases here,  but move 
on to another example, which provides yet stronger evidence against  a pragmatic 
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explanation. It concerns scope underspecification again, and was brought to my 
attention by Uwe Reyle. 
(3 1 )  Every student didn 't pay attention 
(32) Every student overlooked a mistake 
There is no structural difference between sentences (3 1 )  (=(5)) and (32) on the level 
of denotations: Both are ambiguous between two readings, and in both cases one 
reading is included in the other, which should make either sentence a perfect 
candidate for weak ambiguity. Also, there is no difference on the representation 
level , if available techniques for underspecified representation are used. 
Nevertheless, the underspecified reading of (32) seems to be a cognitively easily 
graspable weak ambiguity case, whereas (3 1 )  has a homonymic, strongly ambiguous 
character. 
To sum up, there seems to be no convincing way to explain the differences 
in the behaviour of ambiguous expressions in pragmatic terms. We have to accept 
the fact that the strong-weak distinction is not a matter of use. The range of 
expressions or construction types which have different and mutually exclusive 
specific readings subdivides into cases where there is a cognitively available 
common underspecified reading, as well as cases where it isn't. But there is no 
general property of the denotational interpretation of these expressions which may 
be used to distinguish between strong and weak ambiguity cases. This draws the 
attention directly to the level of representation. The difference between polysemy 
and homonomy for lexical ambiguities could in principle be explained in terms of 
the availability of a common underspecified object-language representation unit. 
This would leave us with the task however to find a separate explanation for the 
ambiguous character offast (concerning the most-general-reading criterion). 
The case of scope ambiguity is harder: There seem to be strong and weak 
cases. None of them can have a unique object-language representation, all of them 
have similar description-language representations . On the one hand, this implies that 
underspecified representations are not just abbreviatory notations, but are the only 
way to express certain "cognit ively real " enti ties of natural- language meaning 
structure .  On the other hand, the fact that a piece of semantic information i s  
expressible in  the underspecification language i s  a s  i rrelevant t o  the strong-weak 
distinction as the question of expressibility in the object language itself is . 
There must be something relevant in word meaning beyond denotations and 
logical  representations. In a way, it seems to be some common conceptual 
substance behind the d i fferent readings ,  which constitutes the unity of  an 
expression. This could be a prototype for colour adjectives and concrete common 
nouns, the "concept of fastness" which goes into the semantics of the stage and the 
individual-level reading of fast, or, to take an example from the area of referential 
underspecification, the " speaker's involvement" for the plural pronoun we, which 
has perfectly accessible underspecified readings, even the extreme one where only 
the speaker is definitely included. 
Another interesting perspective is  suggested by the pair of scope-ambiguous 
expressions ( 3 1 )/(32) .  The weak-strong difference corresponds to a difference in 
deductive propert ies .  As Reyle argues in [Reyle 1 993 )  and [Reyle 1 995 ) ,  the 
extension of standard deduction techniques to underspecified representations makes 
a case di stinction necessary between the status of sub-expressions. The rules of 
direct deduction are sensitive to the question of whether an expression occurs in an 
upward or a downward monotonic position. Since the scope ordering is relevant for 
the monotonicity status, and scope can be underspecified, the monotonicity feature 
may be underspecified, as well .  In this case, direct deduction is impossible, and the 
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only thing left to do IS to spell out the ambiguity, and do deduction separately on the 
readings. The system described in [Reyle 1995] models this interplay between 
underspecified deduction and partial resolution steps. Now, the weak ambiguity case 
(32) is unambiguously upward monotonic and therefore allows direct deduction, 
whereas in the strong ambiguity case (3 1 )  is a case where the universal quantifier is 
of uncertain monotonicity status because it can be ordered either below or above the 
negation operator; therefore (3 1 )  cannot be directly processed, but must be 
disambiguated first. The cognitive reality of a semantic object may be dependent on 
the fact whether the basic reading allows direct processing. 
All this is highly speculative and vague, of course. What we can state with 
�ertainty about �� interrelation bet�een logi�al representation and cognitive reality, 
IS that we are still m a stable state of mformatlOnal underspecification. 
Endnotes 
I [Pinkal 1 995] is a revised and extended English version of [Pinkal 1 985] :  The 
chapters 1 -7 are identical in content; the last chapter is completely revised. I will use 
[Pinkal 1985] as reference, when speaking about old results, 
2 Among them are Quasi-Logical Form developed at SRI Cambridge as part of the 
Core Language Engine (QLF, [Alshawi/Crouch 1 992]) ,  Uwe Reyle ' s  UDRT 
( [Reyle 1993]) ;  Labelled Underspecified Discourse Representation (LUD, [Bos 
1 995 ] )  and Minimal Recursion Semantics (MRS , [Copestake/Sag 1 995 ] ,  
[EgglLebeth 1 995]), which serve as semantic representation formalisms in the MT 
project Verbmobil, Massimo Poesio 's  DRT-based system [Poesio 1 994] , and a 
formalism by Reinhard Muskens, based on his Compos it ional DRT [Muskens 
1 995] ,  and Jan van Eijck's logic of ambiguation [Cooper et al. 1 996] . 
3 The differences between the 3-valued logics of [Lukasiewicz 1 930] , [Kleene 
1 952] ,  [B lau 1 978] concern the treatment of implication and quantifiers ; they are 
discussed in detail in [Pinkal 1 985] .  These differences are not re levant for the 
argument of this paper. Also, I wi l l  not consider the option of indefinitely-valued 
logics ( l i ke fuzzy logi c ) ,  which p lay an important role in  non- l i ngu i st ic  
computational applications. 
4 For a detailed presentation and discussion of the arguments see [Pinkal 1 985 ] ,  
Chapter 4.  - I leave ou t  the computational complexity argument here ,  which has 
played an important role in computational semantics .  To be sure ,  the supervaluation 
account is more complex ,  but " non-truthfunct ional " does not mean "non­
compositional " .  If we decide to  assign a sentence not a truth-value, but  the se t  of its 
verifying classical completions as denotation, then the interpretation of conjunction 
and d isjunction is g iven in a straightforward compositional manner in terms of 
union and intersection, respective ly .  In general , the denotation of every expression 
can be defined as a function from the set of possible completions (or contexts, see 
below) to appropriate extensions . 
5 Using super-valuation for the interpretation of underspec ified representat ions was 
first proposed in the QLF context by [Alshawi/Crouch 1 992 ) ;  see also [Cooper et 
al . 1 994) and [Alshawi 1 996) . The approaches discussed in [van Deemter 1 996] and 
[Reyle 1 995] ,  [Reyle 1 996] also come close to the super-valuation idea. 
6The case of predicative scalar adjectives l ike tall is maybe best described by a 
combination of underspecification ( i .e . ,  underspecification of the modified predicate, 
represented by the meta-variable X in tall (X), and an amount of vagueness which 
remains in every instantiation of the predicate . 
7This is the "cautious" entailment concept proposed by Jan van Eijck in [Cooper et 
al . 1 996] , and di scussed as one possible variant (VV wi thout coherence) in [van 
Deemter 1 996] . Kees van Deemter also tries to catch a wider concept of coherence 
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with logical means� i .e . ,  the fact that the choice of identical readings for two 
occurrences of an ambiguous term is in general preferred, if it allows a sensible 
interpretation. I tend to take this as a pragmatic coherence phenomenon, and to 
separate it from the cases of linguistically required covariation. 
8CHORUS - "Constraint-based Higher-order Representation of Underspecified 
Semantic Information" ,  in the Special Research Division "Ressource-Adaptive 
Cognitive Processes" of the DFG (German Science Foundation) 
91 would like to mention, though, that the framework takes care of all phenomena of 
ellipsis and scope interaction known from the literature, including antecedent­
contained deletion and the Rirschbuehler cases.- For a description of the 
representation language (USDL : Underspecified Semantic Description Language), 
see [Pinkal 1995a] . 
lOA detailed discussion is found in Chapter 8 of [pinkal 1 995]. 
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